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Abstract
Systems exploiting network coding to increase their throughput suffer greatly from pollution attacks
which consist of injecting malicious packets in the network. The pollution attacks are amplified by the
network coding process, resulting in a greater damage than under traditional routing. In this paper,
we address this issue by designing an unconditionally secure authentication code suitable for multicast
network coding. The proposed scheme is robust against pollution attacks from outsiders, as well as
coalitions of malicious insiders. Intermediate nodes can verify the integrity and origin of the packets
received without having to decode, and thus detect and discard the malicious messages in-transit that
fail the verification. This way, the pollution is canceled out before reaching the destinations. We analyze
the performance of the scheme in terms of both multicast throughput and goodput, and show the goodput
gains. We also discuss applications to file distribution.
1 Introduction
Network coding was first introduced in [1] as an innovative approach to characterize the rate region of
multicast networks. Network coding allows intermediate nodes between the source(s) and the destinations
not only to store and forward, but also to encode the received packets before forwarding them. In [2], Li
et. al showed that linear coding suffices to achieve the max-flow from the source to each receiving node
in multicast networks, where intermediate nodes generate outgoing packets as linear combinations of their
incoming packets. In line with [2], [3] gave an algebraic framework for linear network coding with further
developments for arbitrary networks and robust networking. For practical issues, [4] proposed a network
coding framework that allows to deal with random packet loss, change of topology and delays.
Network coding offers various advantages not only for maximizing the usage of network resources but
also for robustness to network impairments and packet losses. Various applications of network coding have
therefore appeared ranging from file download and content distribution in peer-to-peer networks [5, 6, 7] to
distributed file storage systems [9, 10].
While much of the literature on network coding discusses network capacity or throughput, it is also
natural to wonder about the impact of network coding on network security. Pollution attacks, which consist
of injecting malicious packets in the network, are for example more dangerous for the systems exploiting
network coding than for those using traditional routing. Indeed, in this scenario, malicious packets may
come from the modification of received packets by a malicious intermediate node, or from the creation of
bogus packets then injected in the network by an outside adversary. With no integrity check performed for
packets in transit in the network, an honest intermediate node receiving a single malicious packet would
perform the encoding of the malicious packet with other packets resulting in multiple corrupted outgoing
packets that are then forwarded on to the next nodes. The corrupted packets propagate then all through
the network which creates severe damages, amplified by the network coding process.
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1.1 Authentication techniques
One way to address the pollution attack problem is through authentication techniques. Packets in transit
at the intermediate nodes should be authenticated before being encoded and forwarded, to verify both their
origin and their content. The goal is to achieve authentication even in presence of both inside and outside
attackers who can observe the messages flowing through the network and inject selected messages. The
success of their attacks depends on their ability in sending a message that will be accepted as valid (i.e.,
impersonation attack) or in observing a message and then altering the message content (i.e. substitution
attack) in such a way that intermediate nodes and destinations cannot detect it.
Let us recall that authentication consists of the following properties, though we will focus here only on
the first two:
• data integrity: protecting the data from any modification by malicious entities,
• data origin authentication: validating the identity of the origin of the data,
• non-repudiation: guaranteeing that the origin of the data cannot deny having created and sent data.
To satisfy these properties, messages at the source are appended either a digital signature, a message
authentication code (MAC) or an authentication code (also called tag). There exist subtle differences among
these techniques. First, MAC and authentication codes ensure data integrity and data origin authentication
while digital signatures provide also non-repudiation. Second, MACs, authentication codes, and digital
signatures should be differentiated depending on what type of security they achieve: computational security
(i.e., vulnerable against an attacker that has unlimited computational resources) or unconditional security
(i.e., robust against an attacker that has unlimited computational resources). MACs are proven to be
computationally secure while the security of authentication codes is unconditional [11]. Digital signature
schemes exist for both computational security and unconditional security. However while computationally
secure digital signatures can be verified by anyone with a public verification algorithm, the unconditionally
secure digital signatures can only be verified by intended receivers as it is for MACs and authentication codes
[12].
1.2 Related work
Several authentication schemes have been recently proposed in the literature to detect polluted packets at
intermediate nodes [8, 13, 14, 15, 16]. All of them are based on cryptographic functions with computational
assumptions, as detailed below.
The scheme in [8] for network-coded content distribution allows intermediate nodes to detect malicious
packets injected in the network and to alert neighboring nodes when a malicious packet is detected. It uses
a homomorphic hash function to generate hash values of the encoded blocks of data that are then sent to
the intermediate nodes and destinations prior to the encoded data. The transmission of these hash values
is performed over a pre-established secure channel which makes the scheme impractical. The use of hash
functions makes the scheme fall into the category of computationally secure schemes.
The signature scheme in [13] is a homomorphic signature scheme based on Weil pairing over elliptic
curves, while the one proposed in [14] is a homomorphic signature scheme based on RSA. For both schemes,
intermediate nodes can authenticate the packets in transit without decoding, and generate a verifiable
signature of the packet that they have just encoded without knowing the signer’s secret key. However, these
schemes require one key pair for each file to be verified, which is not practical either.
The signature scheme proposed in [15] uses a standard signature scheme based on the hardness of the
discrete logarithm problem. The blocks of data are considered as vectors spanning a subspace. The signature
is not performed on vectors containing data blocks, but on vectors orthogonal to all data vectors in the given
subspace. The signature verification allows to check if the received vector belongs to the data subspace. The
security of their scheme holds in that no adversary knowing a signature on a given subspace of data vectors
is able to forge a valid signature for any vector not in this given subspace. This scheme requires also fresh
keys for every file.
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Finally, the signature schemes given in [16] follow the approach given in [15] with improvements in terms
of public key size and per-packet overhead. The signature schemes proposed are designed to authenticate a
linear subspace formed by the vectors containing data blocks. Signatures on a linear subspace are sufficient
to authenticate all the vectors in this same subspace. With these schemes, a single public key can be used
to verify multiple files.
1.3 Organization and contribution
In this paper, we propose an unconditionally secure solution that provides multicast network coding with
robustness against pollution attacks. Our solution allows intermediate nodes and destinations to verify
the data origin and integrity of the messages received without decoding, and thus to detect and discard
the malicious messages that fail the verification. It is important to note that destinations must receive a
sufficient number of uncorrupted messages to decode and recover the entire file sent by the source. However,
our solution provides the destinations with the ability to filter out corrupted messages and to have them
filtered out by intermediate nodes as well.
Our scheme here aims for unconditional security. We rely on information theoretic strength rather than
on problems that are thought to be hard as in [8, 14, 15, 16]. Unconditional authentication codes have led
to the development of multi-receiver authentication codes [17, 18] that are highly relevant in the context of
network coding. Multi-receiver authentication codes allow any one of the receivers (in the context of network
coding, that may be intermediate nodes and destinations) to verify the integrity and origin of a received
message but require the source to be designated. Our scheme is inspired from the (k, V ) multi-receiver
authentication code proposed in [18] that is robust against a coalition of k − 1 malicious receivers amongst
V and in which every key can be used to authenticate up to M messages. We define and adapt the use of
(k, V ) multi-receiver authentication codes to network coding so that intermediate nodes can detect malicious
packets without having to decode.
Our scheme is adaptive to the specifications of the application in use and the network setting. Its
efficiency is scenario-dependent. The communication and computational costs are function of parameters
related to the application in use (i.e., the numberM of messages to be authenticated under the same key and
the length l of the messages) and to the network setting (i.e., the number of colluded malicious adversaries
k − 1 to be considered). However for the communication cost, one independent advantage exists over the
previous schemes. Our scheme is particularly efficient in terms of communication overhead, since contrarily
to all existing schemes [8, 14, 15, 16], it requires one single symbol only for tracking purposes.
We give a multicast goodput analysis to assess the impact of pollution attacks on multicast throughput
and to show how much goodput gain our scheme offers. We show how our scheme can be used for applications
such as content and file distribution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly present the network coding model we
consider and define what are authentication codes in general and in particular for network coding. Section 3
presents the authentication scheme, whose analysis is presented both in Section 4 for security, and in Section
5 for performance. Section 6 shows how our scheme can be used for content and file distribution. Future
work is addressed in the conclusion.
2 A Network Coding Setting for Authentication Codes
We start by introducing the multicast network coding model we are considering. Since we are not aware of
prior work on authentication codes for network coding, we then propose a definition of authentication codes
for multicast network coding.
2.1 The multicast network coding model
The model of network we consider is an acyclic graph having unit capacity edges, with a single source S,
which wants to send a set of n messages to T destinations D1, . . . , DT . Messages are seen as sequences
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of elements of a finite field with q elements, denoted by Fq. Each edge e of the graph carries a symbol
y(e) ∈ Fq at a time. For a node of the graph, the symbols on its outgoing edges are linear combinations,
called local encoding, of the symbols entering the node through its incoming edges. If x1, . . . , xn are the
symbols to be sent by the source S at a time, we have by induction that on any edge e, y(e) is actually a
linear combination of the source symbols, that is y(e) =
∑n
i=1 gi(e)xi, where the coefficients gi(e) describe
the coding operation. The vector g(e) = [g1(e), . . . , gn(e)] is thus called the global encoding vector along the
edge e. We can describe the messages received by a node in the network with h incoming edges e1, . . . , eh
by the following matrix equation:

y(e1)
...
y(eh)

 =


g1(e1) . . . gn(e1)
...
...
g1(eh) . . . gn(eh)


︸ ︷︷ ︸
G


x1
...
xn

 ∈ Fnq
where G is called a transfer matrix. In particular, the destination nodes Di, i = 1, . . . , T , can recover the
source symbols x1, . . . , xn, assuming that their respective transfer matrix GDi has rank n, i = 1, . . . , T (this
also means h ≥ n). In this paper, we are not concerned about the existence of global encoding vectors,
and we thus assume that we deal with a network for which suitable linear encoding vectors exist, so that
destination nodes are able to decode the received packets correctly.
We can packetize the symbols y(e) flowing on each edge e into vectors y(e) = [y1(e), . . . , yN (e)] ∈ F
N
q ,
and likewise, the source symbols xi can be grouped as xi = [xi,1, . . . , xi,N ] ∈ F
N
q , so that the equation at a
node with h incoming edges can be rewritten as

y(e1)
...
y(eh)

 =


g1(e1) . . . gn(e1)
...
...
g1(eh) . . . gn(eh)




x1
...
xn

 ∈ Fh×Nq (1)
or equivalently 

y(e1)
...
y(eh)

 = G


x1,1 x1,2 . . . x1,N
...
...
...
xn,1 xn,2 . . . xn,N

 ∈ Fh×Nq
where x1, . . . ,xn are the n messages of length N to be sent by the source.
Example 1 Consider the small network (taken from [3]) as shown in Fig. 1, where the source S wants to
send n = 3 messages x1,x2,x3 ∈ F
N
2 to T = 1 destination D1, through two nodes R1 and R2.
The source computes the vector
 y(e1)y(e2)
y(e3)

 =

 g1(e1) g2(e1) g3(e1)g1(e2) g2(e2) g3(e2)
g1(e3) g2(e3) g3(e3)



 x1x2
x3


as a linear combination of its three messages x1,x2,x3 and sends each y(ei) over the edge ei, i = 1, 2, 3.
The node R1 receives y(e1) and y(e2), which it encodes as follows using its global encoding vectors g(e4) =
(α11, α12) and g(e5) = (α21, α22):(
y(e4)
y(e5)
)
=
(
α11 α12
α21 α22
)(
y(e1)
y(e2)
)
=
(
α11 α12
α21 α22
)(
g1(e1) g2(e1) g3(e1)
g1(e2) g2(e2) g3(e2)
) x1x2
x3


=:
(
g1(e4) g2(e4) g3(e4)
g1(e5) g2(e5) g3(e5)
) x1x2
x3


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Figure 1: A small example of network with one source S, one destination D1 and two relay nodes R1 and
R2. Global encoding vectors have coefficients in F2.
while the node R2 gets
(
y(e3)
y(e4)
)
=
(
0 0 1
α11 α12 0
) y(e1)y(e2)
y(e3)


=
(
0 0 1
α11 α12 0
) g1(e1) g2(e1) g3(e1)g1(e2) g2(e2) g3(e2)
g1(e3) g2(e3) g3(e3)



 x1x2
x3


=:
(
g1(e3) g2(e3) g3(e3)
g1(e4) g2(e4) g3(e4)
) x1x2
x3

 .
Denote by g(e6) = (β11, β12) and g(e7) = (β21, β22) the global encoding vectors of node R2 corresponding to
the edges e6 and e7 respectively. Finally, the destination gets
 y(e5)y(e6)
y(e7)


=

 α21 α22 0 00 0 β11 β12
0 0 β21 β22




y(e1)
y(e2)
y(e3)
y(e4)


=

 α21 α22 0 00 0 β11 β12
0 0 β21 β22




g1(e1) g2(e1) g3(e1)
g1(e2) g2(e2) g3(e2)
g1(e3) g2(e3) g3(e3)
α11g1(e1) + α12g1(e2) α11g2(e1) + α12g2(e2) α11g3(e1) + α12g3(e2)



 x1x2
x3


=:

 g1(e5) g2(e5) g3(e5)g1(e6) g2(e6) g3(e6)
g1(e7) g2(e7) g3(e7)


︸ ︷︷ ︸
GD1

 x1x2
x3

 .
The destination D1 can decode if the global vectors have been chosen such that the transfer matrix G is
invertible. The global vectors are linear combinations of the local encoding coefficients αij at R1 and βij
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at R2, i, j = 1, 2. There are many configurations over F2 such that G is invertible. Take for example
g1(e1) = g2(e2) = g3(e3) = 1, g1(e2) = g2(e1) = g3(e1) = g1(e3) = g2(e3) = g3(e2) = 0, with β12 = β21 =
α12 = α21 = 1 and β11 = β22 = α11 = α12 = 0 (this yields the transfer matrix to be equal to the identity
matrix).
2.2 Authentication codes for network coding
Since we are not aware of prior work on network coding authentication codes, let us start by recalling the
setting for classical authentication schemes, as proposed by Desmedt et al. In [17], the authors proposed a
model for unconditionally secure authentication where one transmitter communicates to multiple receivers
who can not all be trusted. In this scenario, the transmitter first appends a tag to a common message which
is then broadcasted to all the receivers, who can separately verify the authenticity of the tagged message
using their own private secret key. There is among the receivers a group of malicious receivers, who use their
secret key and all the previous messages to construct fake messages. A (k, V ) multi-receiver authentication
system refers to a scheme where V receivers are present, among which at most k−1 can cheat. The malicious
nodes can perform either an impersonation attack, if they try to construct a valid tagged message without
having seen any transmitted message before, or a substitution attack, if they first listen to at least one tagged
message before trying to fake a tag in such a way that the receiver will accept the tagged message. Perfect
protection is obtained if the best chance of success in the attack is 1/|T | where |T | is the size of tag space,
namely, the attacker cannot do better than make a guess, and pick randomly one tag.
In [18], the scheme of Desmedt et al. has been generalized to the case where the same key can be used
to authenticate up to M messages.
The network coding scenario that we consider in this paper is a multicast setting, where one source wants
to send a set of messages to T destinations. In order to propose a definition of network coding authentication
scheme, let us first understand the main differences with respect to the classical multi-receiver scenario:
1. The source does not broadcast the same message on all its outgoing edges, but sends different linear
combinations of the n messages x1, . . . ,xn, which means that the key used by the source to sign the
messages will be used more than once, actually at least as many times as there are outgoing edges from
the source.
2. We are interested in a more general network scenario, where intermediate nodes play a role. In
particular, it is relevant in the context of pollution attacks that not only destination nodes but also
intermediate nodes may check the authenticity of the packets. We call such nodes in the network
verifying nodes. This set may include part or all of the destination nodes D1, . . . , DT . This makes
a big difference in network coding, since while the destination nodes do have a transfer matrix to
recover the message sent, this is not the case of regular intermediate nodes, which must perform the
authentication check without being able a priori to decode.
Based on the above considerations, we propose the following definition for multicast network coding.
Definition 1 We call a (k, V,M) network coding authentication code an authentication code for V
verifying nodes, which is unconditionally secure against either substitution or impersonation attacks done by
a group of at most k − 1 adversaries, possibly belonging to the verifying nodes, where the source can use the
same key at most M times.
3 The Authentication Scheme
Recall that we have a single source S, which wants to multicast n messages to T destinations D1, . . . , DT .
We will denote the set of messages by s1, . . . , sn to refer to the actual data to be sent, while we keep the
notation x1, . . . ,xn ∈ F
N
q for the whole packets, including the authentication tag. Each message si is of
length l, si = (si,1, . . . , si,l), so that while each symbol si,j belongs to Fq, we can see the whole message as
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part of Flq ≃ Fql . We also assume a set of nodes R1, . . . , RV which can verify the authentication. A priori,
this set can include the destinations, but can also be larger. Typically we will assume that V >> T , in the
context of pollution attacks.
We now present our (k, V,M) network coding authentication scheme and discuss its efficiency. Security
will be analyzed in the next section.
3.1 Set-up and authentication tag generation
We propose the following authentication scheme:
1. Key generation: A trusted authority randomly generates M + 1 polynomials P0(x), . . . , PM (x) ∈
Fql [x] and chooses V distinct values x1, . . . , xV ∈ Fql . These polynomials are of degree k − 1, and we
denote them by
Pi(x) = ai0 + ai1x+ ai2x
2 + . . .+ ai,k−1x
k−1,
i = 0, . . . ,M .
2. Key distribution: The trusted authority gives as private key to the source S the M +1 polynomials
(P0(x), . . . , PM (x)), and as private key for each verifier Ri the M +1 polynomials evaluated at x = xi,
namely (P0(xi), . . . , PM (xi)), i = 1, . . . , V . The values x1, ..., xV are made public. The keys can be
given to the nodes at the same time as they are given their local encoding vectors.
3. Authentication tag: Let us assume that the source wants to send n data messages s1, . . . , sn ∈ F
l
q.
The source computes the following polynomial
Asi(x) = P0(x) + siP1(x) + s
q
iP2(x) . . .+ s
q(M−1)
i PM (x) ∈ Fql [x]
which forms the authentication tag of each si, i = 1, . . . , n. The packets xi to be actually sent by the
source are of the form
xi = [1, si, Asi(x)] ∈ F
1+l+kl
q , i = 1, . . . , n.
The tag is attached after the message, and 1 bit is added at the beginning, which will be used to keep
track of the network coding coefficients.
The number M + 1 of polynomials Pi(x) is related to the number of usages of the key, while the degree
k − 1 corresponds to the size of attackers coalition.
Note that while making public the values x1, . . . , xV still may help an attacker, we prefer to make them
public and prove that actually this does not help the attacker, in order to minimize the amount of secret
information given to the nodes.
3.2 Verification and correctness of the authentication tag
In order to discuss the authentication check, let us recall from (1) what is the received tagged vector at a
node Ri with ih incoming edges when the source is sending xj = [1, sj , Asj (x)] ∈ F
1+l+kl
q , j = 1, . . . , n:

y(ei1 )
...
y(eih )

 =


g1(ei1) . . . gn(ei1)
...
...
g1(eih) . . . gn(eih)




1 s1 As1 (x)
...
1 sn Asn(x)


=


∑n
j=1 gj(ei1)
∑n
j=1 gj(ei1)sj
∑n
j=1 gj(ei1)Asj (x)
...
...∑n
j=1 gj(eih)
∑n
j=1 gj(eih)sj
∑n
j=1 gj(eih )Asj (x)

 .
Recall that a verifying node Ri further has a private key given by
P0(xi), . . . , PM (xi).
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For each incoming edge ek, k = i1, . . . , ih, the node Ri can thus compute the product of the received data
on the edge by the private keys, as follows:
P0(xi)
n∑
j=1
gj(ek), P1(xi)
n∑
j=1
gj(ek)sj
and similarly for the key P2(xi)
P2(xi)

 n∑
j=1
gj(ek)sj


q
= P2(xi)
n∑
j=1
(gj(ek)sj)
q = P2(xi)
n∑
j=1
gj(ek)s
q
j
and the other keys Pj(ek), j = 3, . . . ,M . For example:
PM (xi)

 n∑
j=1
gj(ek)sj


q(M−1)
= PM (xi)
n∑
j=1
(gj(ek)sj)
q(M−1) = PM (xi)
n∑
j=1
gj(ek)s
qM−1
j .
On the other hand, it can evaluate the polynomial
n∑
j=1
gj(ek)Asj (x)
in xi, which is public. This yields
n∑
j=1
gj(ek)Asj (xi) =
n∑
j=1
gj(ek)(P0(xi) + sjP1(xi) + s
q
jP2(xi) + . . .+ s
q(M−1)
j PM (xi))
=
n∑
j=1
gj(ek)P0(xi) +
n∑
j=1
gj(ek)sjP1(xi) + . . .+
n∑
j=1
gj(ek)s
q(M−1)
j PM (xi).
The node Ri accepts a packet on its incoming edge ek if the two computations coincide, which we have just
shown they do if there is no alteration of the protocol. Note that the verifying node does not need to decode
the message (which it may not be able to do) in order to perform the check.
Example 2 Consider the network of Example 1 with a (2, 2, 3) authentication scheme, where we have V = 2
nodes which verify the authentication tags, say the relay node R1 and the destination D1, and the key can be
used 3 times, to protect against a coalition of at most 2 attackers (either only R2, or R2 and R1 if the latter
gets corrupted though it has a private key). The source S wants to send two messages s1, s2 ∈ F23 ≃ F
3
2,
that is s1 = (s1,1, s1,2, s1,3) ∈ F
3
2 and s2 = (s2,1, s2,2, s2,3) ∈ F
3
2 with si,j ∈ F2 = {0, 1}. During the key
generation and distribution, we have that:
• The source is given the M + 1 = 3 polynomials P0(x) = a00 + a01x, P1(x) = a10 + a11x, and P2(x) =
a20 + a21x, of degree k − 1 = 1, with coefficients aij in F23 .
• The values x1, x2 ∈ F23 are made public.
• The relay node R1 receives the secret values P0(x1), P1(x1), P2(x1) as its private key.
• The destination node D1 receives the secret values P0(x2), P1(x2), P2(x2) as its private key.
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parameters notation symb/item total in Fq
source private keys Pi(x), i = 0, . . . ,M k k(M + 1)l
public values xi, i = 1, . . . , V 1 V l
verifiers’ private keys Pi(xi), i = 0, . . . ,M M + 1 V (M + 1)l
tags Asi(x), i = 1, . . . , n kl nkl
Table 1: Sizes for the keys and tags of the proposed (k, V,M) scheme.
The source computes two authentication tags:
As1(x) = P0(x) + s1P1(x) + s
2
1P2(x)
= (a00 + a10s1 + a20s
2
1) + x(a01 + a11s1 + a21s
2
1)
=: b10 + xb11, b10, b11 ∈ F8
As2(x) = P0(x) + s2P1(x) + s
2
2P2(x)
= (a00 + a10s2 + a20s
2
2) + x(a01 + a11s2 + a21s
2
2)
=: b20 + xb21, b20, b21 ∈ F8.
The two packets to be sent are
x1 = [1, s1, As1(x)] = [1, s1,1, s1,2, s1,3, b10, b11] ∈ (F2)
10
x2 = [1, s2, As2(x)] = [1, s2,1, s2,2, s2,3, b20, b21] ∈ (F2)
10.
The first node R1 has two input edges e1, e2, and its received vector is given by(
y(e1)
y(e2)
)
=
(
g1(e1) g2(e1)
g1(e2) g2(e2)
)(
1 s1 As1(x)
1 s2 As2(x)
)
=
(
g1(e1) + g2(e1) g1(e1)s1 + g2(e1)s2 g1(e1)As1(x) + g2(e1)As2(x)
g1(e2) + g2(e2) g1(e2)s1 + g2(e2)s2 g1(e2)As2(x) + g2(e2)As2(x)
)
.
The data which is public is x1, x2. Using x1 and its private key (P0(x1), P1(x1), P2(x1)), R1 can compute
from y(e1) the following three terms:
P0(x1)(g1(e1) + g2(e1)), P1(x1)(g1(e1)s1 + g2(e1)s2),
and
P2(x1)(g1(e1)s1 + g2(e1)s2)
2 = P2(x1)(g1(e1)
2s21 + g2(e1)
2s22) = P2(x1)(g1(e1)s
2
1 + g2(e1)s
2
2)
whose sum gives
P0(x1)(g1(e1) + g2(e1)) + P1(x1)(g1(e1)s1 + g2(e1)s2) + P2(x1)(g1(e1)s
2
1 + g2(e1)s
2
2). (2)
Since R1 has also received g1(e1)As1(x)+g2(e1)As2 (x), it can evaluate the polynomial in x1 and check whether
g1(e1)As1(x1) + g2(e1)As2 (x1) is equal to the sum (2). If yes, the node R1 accepts the authentication tag
and re-encode the packet, otherwise, the packet is discarded. A similar check is performed on e2, and by the
destination on its incoming edges using its own private key.
3.3 Parameters and efficiency
We discuss the efficiency of the proposed scheme, based on the communication, computation, and storage
costs. The different parameters involved are summarized in Table 1.
There are two classes of parameters, those fixed by the network, namely, the number T of destination
nodes, the network code alphabet Fq, the length l of the data packets, and n the number of messages to be
sent by the source. We then have the security parameters k, V and M , which first depend on the network
parameters:
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• Constraints on V : We will typically take V >> T , which means that more nodes than just the
destinations will check the authentication tags. We could imagine V < T if we do not even want all the
destinations to check the authentication of their packets. However our goal is to have enough nodes
in the network (though not necessarily all of them) verifying the integrity of the packets to avoid the
propagation of polluted packets. We further have ql ≥ V , since private verification keys are obtained
by evaluating the polynomials in xi, i = 1, . . . , V . If V ≥ q
l, then we are forced to use some values of
Fq more than once, and the private keys are not unique anymore. Thus q
l ≥ V >> T .
• Constraints on M : We assume thatM is at least greater than n, to be able to protect with the same
key all the messages to be sent within one encoding round.
The scheme communication cost mainly relies on the size of the authentication tag |Asi |, i = 1, . . . , n,
which is O(kl), since the length of the tag is kl, and we also have to consider the augmentation of the data
vectors by one symbol element performed at the source.
The computational costs involve computing and appending the tag at the source, and verifying the tag
at some intermediate nodes and at the destinations.
• Cost at the source: For creating a tag based on a message si ∈ Fql , recall that the source computes
the following polynomial:
Asi(x) = P0(x) + siP1(x) + s
q
iP2(x) . . .+ s
q(M−1)
i PM (x) ∈ Fql [x],
which involves thus M − 1 exponentiations in Fql to compute s
qj
i , j = 1, . . . ,M − 1, and then kM
multiplications in Fql to get Pj(x)s
q(j−1)
i , j = 1, . . . ,M . This is repeated for each of the n messages si,
i = 1, . . . , n.
• Cost at the verifying nodes: A verifying node Ri needs to do two things to check the tag. First, it
computes
P0(xi)
n∑
j=1
gj(ek), P1(xi)
n∑
j=1
gj(ek)sj , . . . , PM (xi)

 n∑
j=1
gj(ek)sj


qM−1
which takes M − 1 exponentiations in Fql and M + 1 multiplications in Fql , before evaluating the
polynomial arrived on its incoming edge ek
n∑
j=1
gj(ek)Asj (x) ∈ Fql [x]
in the public key xi ∈ Fql . Since the polynomial is of degree k − 1, its evaluation requires k − 2
exponentiations in Fq for x
j
i , j = 2, . . . , k − 1, and k − 1 multiplications in Fql to multiply each x
j
i ,
j = 1, . . . , k−1, with the coefficients of the polynomial. This is done for each of the ih incoming edges.
Finally, the storage cost consists of the size of the keys, that is M + 1 keys of size k for the source, and
the M + 1 polynomials evaluated in one value of Fql , yielding M + 1 values in Fql for each of the verifying
nodes.
All the costs of the proposed scheme are summarized in Table 2.
4 Security Analysis of the Authentication Scheme
Threats are coming from either outside or inside opponents, who can attempt either impersonation or
substitution attacks. Outside opponents are assumed to be able to see the data on the incoming edges of
some of the intermediate nodes. Inside opponents of course see the messages transiting through them, but
the difference is that some of them may actually be verifying nodes, and thus they can use their own private
10
Tag or signature size kl
Communication cost kl+ 1
Tag or signature n(M − 1)l exp
computational cost nkMl mult
Verification ((M − 1) + k − 2)lh exp
computational cost ((M + 1) + k − 1)lh mult
Storage at the source (M + 1)lk
Storage at the verifiers (M + 1)l
Table 2: Efficiency of the proposed scheme. The parameter h denotes the number of incoming edges of a
verifying node. Operations (multiplications and exponentiations) as well as numbers of symbols are in Fq.
keys to forge a substitution attack. The analysis focuses on the worst case scenario, namely a coalition of
inside malicious nodes in possession of private keys is trying to make a substitution attack, that is, to send a
fake packet after observing tagged messages in such a way that a node which checks for authentication will
actually accept the faked authentication tag.
4.1 Preliminaries
In the following, we may write as matrix indices the dimension of the matrices for clarity.
Suppose that a malicious node has ih incoming edges, with received vector

y(ei1)
...
y(eih )

 =


g1(ei1) . . . gn(ei1)
...
...
g1(eih) . . . gn(eih)




1 s1 As1(x)
...
...
...
1 sn Asn(x)


=


∑n
j=1 gj(ei1)
∑n
j=1 gj(ei1)sj
∑n
j=1 gj(ei1)Asj (x)
...
...
...∑n
j=1 gj(eih)
∑n
j=1 gj(eih)sj
∑n
j=1 gj(eih )Asj (x)

 ,
from which it tries to learn about the source private keys. If we write
Asj (x) = P0(x) + sjP1(x) + . . .+ s
qM−1
j PM (x)
= bj0 + bj1x+ . . .+ bj,k−1x
k−1 ∈ Fql [x],
we have that for all incoming edges em
n∑
j=1
gj(em)Asj (x) =
n∑
j=1
gj(em)(bj0 + bj1x+ . . .+ bj,k−1x
k−1)
= cm0 + cm1x+ . . .+ cm,k−1x
k−1,
where
cmi =
n∑
j=1
gj(em)bji ∈ Fql .
Thus, the malicious node actually knows cmi, i = 1, . . . , k − 1, for every incoming edge em, m = i1, . . . , ih,
and upon reception of its incoming vector, it can obtain the following system of linear equations:
Ak×(M+1)G(M+1)×h = Ck×h. (3)
11
Both the matrix G containing the network coding coefficients and the matrix C respectively given by
C =


c10 . . . ch,0
...
...
c1,k−1 . . . ch,k−1

 , G =


∑n
j=1 gj(ei1) . . .
∑n
j=1 gj(eih)∑n
j=1 gj(ei1)sj . . .
∑n
j=1 gj(eih)sj
...
...∑n
j=1 gj(ei1)s
q(M−1)
j . . .
∑n
j=1 gj(eih)s
q(M−1)
j


are known to the malicious node, while the k × (M + 1) matrix A given by
A =


a0,0 a1,0 . . . aM,0
a0,1 a1,1 aM,1
...
...
...
a0,k−1 a1,k−1 . . . aM,k−1


is to be found. A has on its ith column the coefficients ai0, . . . , ai,k−1 of the ith secret polynomial Pi, and
thus contains all the coefficients of the source’s private keys.
Let us now assume that K nodes collaborate to make a substitution attack. Each of them first obtains
vectors of data from the network, and can thus collect a system of linear equations of the form
AGi = Ci, i = 1, . . . ,K,
as explained in (3). The number of columns of Gi depends on the number of incoming edges hi at the ith
corrupted node. All together, this gives a new system of linear equations of the form
Ak×(M+1)G(M+1)×(h1+...+hK) = Ck×(h1+...+hK)
with
G = [G1 G2 . . . GK ], C = [C1, . . . , CK ]
where all matrices G, C and A have coefficients in Fql .
We now take into account that some of the nodes who are given the private keys to check the authen-
tication could be corrupted. Since we assume a group of K malicious nodes, let us furthermore assume the
worst case, namely that all of them actually possess a private key (P0(xi), . . . , PM (xi)), where i belongs to
a subset of cardinality K of {1, . . . , V }. Without loss of generality we can assume that i goes from 1 to K.
Since the values x1, . . . , xV are made public, the group of adversaries can actually build another system
of linear equations which exploits their knowledge of the private keys, namely
XK×kAk×(M+1) = PK×(M+1)
where
X =


1 x1 . . . x
k−1
1
1 x2 . . . x
k−1
2
...
...
...
1 xK . . . x
k−1
K


contains the public key values, as before
A =


a0,0 a1,0 . . . aM,0
a0,1 a1,1 . . . aM,1
...
...
...
a0,k−1 a1,k−1 . . . aM,k−1


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contains the coefficients of the private key to be found by the group of attackers, and
P =


P0(x1) P1(x1) . . . PM (x1)
P0(x2) P1(x2) . . . PM (x2)
...
...
...
P0(xK) P1(xK) . . . PM (xK)

 ,
contains the private keys of the corrupted nodes.
Since the polynomials P0, . . . , PM have degree k − 1, it is clear that K can be at most k − 1, otherwise
from the knowledge of only the private and public keys, the group of attackers can recover the source’s
private key, i.e., they can solve the system of equations and recover A.
By putting together the information given by the private keys and the one gathered from all the received
vectors, the group of adversaries has now the knowledge of the following linear systems of equations for
trying to find the source private key:
Ak×(M+1)G(M+1)×H = Ck×H , XK×kAk×(M+1) = PK×(M+1),
where H = h1+ . . .+hK is the aggregated number of incoming edges for all corrupted nodes and K ≤ k− 1.
4.2 Main analysis
Let us start this part by proving some technical lemmas.
Lemma 1 Consider the finite field Fq′ and the polynomial F (x, y) in Fq′ [x, y] given by
F (x, y) = (x− α1) . . . (x− αQ)(y − β1) . . . (y − βR)
of degree Q in x and R in y. Then there exists a (Q+ 1)× (R + 1) matrix A such that

1 α1 . . . α
Q
1
1 α2 . . . α
Q
2
...
...
1 αq . . . α
Q
q

A = 0q×(R+1) and A


1 1 . . . 1
β1 β2 . . . βr
...
...
βR1 β
R
2 . . . β
R
r

 = 0(Q+1)×r,
for 1 ≤ q ≤ Q and 1 ≤ r ≤ R.
Proof. Let us develop the products in x and y of F (x, y) = (x − α1) . . . (x − αQ)(y − β1) . . . (y − βR)
respectively to get
a(x) = (x− α1) . . . (x− αQ) = a0 + a1x+ . . .+ aQx
Q
and
b(y) = (y − β1) . . . (y − βR) = b0 + b1y + . . .+ bRy
R.
Now we can write
F (x, y) = a(x)b(y) = (1, x, . . . , xQ)


a0
a1
...
aQ

 (b0, b1, . . . , bR)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A


1
y
...
yR


for the matrix A with coefficients in Fq′ . Since F (αq, y) = 0 for 1 ≤ q ≤ Q, we have that
F (αq, y) = (1, αq, . . . , α
Q
q )A


1
y
...
yR

 = 0
for all y which proves the first equality. The claim follows similarly by using that F (x, βr) = 0 for 1 ≤ r ≤ R.
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Example 3 Take
F (x, y) = (x− α1)(y − β1)(y − β2)
= (x− α1)(y
2 + y(−β1 − β2) + β1β2).
We have that
F (x, y) = (1, x)
(
−α1
1
)
(β1β2,−β1 − β2, 1)

 1y
y2


= (1, x)
(
−α1β1β2 α1(β1 + β2) −α1
β1β2 −(β1 + β2) 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A

 1y
y2

 .
Thus
F (α1, y) = (1, α1)A

 1y
y2

 = 0
and
(1, α1)A = (0, 0, 0).
Lemma 2 Consider the finite field Fq′ .
1. Let
b(y) = b0 + b1y + b2y
2 + . . .+ bqy
q + . . .+ bqM−1y
qM−1
be a polynomial in Fq′ [y]. If all the coefficients bi are zero, but for the M + 1 coefficients b0 and bqj ,
j = 0, . . . ,M −1 which can take any values in Fq′ , then for all choices of γ1, . . . , γH in Fq′ , there exists
a polynomial c(y) ∈ Fq′ [y] of degree q
M−1 −H such that
b(y) = (y − γ1) · · · (y − γH)c(y)
provided that H ≤M .
2. Consider the polynomial F (x, y) in Fq′ [x, y] given by
F (x, y) = (x− α1) · · · (x− αQ)b(y)
of degree Q in x and where b(y) = b0 + b1y + b2y
q + . . . + bMy
qM−1 is as above, in particular it is of
degree qM−1 and has γ1, . . . , γH ∈ Fq′ as roots. Then there exists a (Q + 1)× (M + 1) matrix A such
that


1 α1 . . . α
Q
1
1 α2 . . . α
Q
2
...
1 αq . . . α
Q
q

A = 0q×(M+1) and A


1 1 . . . 1
γ1 γ2 . . . γH
γq1 γ
q
2 . . . γ
q
H
...
γq
M−1
1 γ
qM−1
2 . . . γ
qM−1
H

 = 0(Q+1)×H ,
for 1 ≤ q ≤ Q and 1 ≤ H ≤M .
Proof.
14
1. Consider the polynomial
b(y) = b0 + b1y + b2y
2 + . . .+ bqy
q + . . .+ bqM−1y
qM−1
where all the coefficients bi are zero, but for the M + 1 coefficients b0 and bqj , j = 0, . . . ,M − 1 which
can take any values in Fq′ . For all choices of γ1, . . . , γH in Fq′ , we can form the polynomial d(y) by
defining
d(y) = (y − γ1)(y − γ2) · · · (y − γH).
What we claim is that, provided that H ≤M , there exists a polynomial c(y) ∈ Fq′ [y] such that
b(y) = (y − γ1) · · · (y − γH)c(y) = d(y)c(y),
or in other words, we can choose c(y) such that
(y − γ1) · · · (y − γH)c(y)
is a polynomial whose coefficients are all zero but for M +1 of them, which are the constant term and
the qjth term, for j = 0, . . . ,M − 1.
To prove this, let us write d(y) as
d(y) = d0 + d1y + d2y
2 + . . .+ dHy
H .
The equation d(y)c(y) = b(y) can be rewritten, by identifying the coefficients of y, as


d0 0
d1 d0
... d1
. . .
dH
... d0
0 dH
. . .
dH


︸ ︷︷ ︸
D of size (qM−1+1)×(qM−1−H+1)


c0
c1
...
cqM−1−H

 =


b0
b1
...
bqM−1

 .
Among the qM−1 + 1 coefficients bi, we do not have any constraint on the constant term and the q
jth
term j = 0, . . . ,M−1, which can take any value. We only have as constraints that the other coefficients
are zero. We thus care about qM−1 + 1− (M + 1) = qM−1 −M of them, which means we can remove
M +1 rows from both sides of the above system of equations. The matrix D containing the coefficients
di is now a (q
M−1−M)× (qM−1−H+1) matrix. Any wanted polynomial c(y) corresponds to a vector
(c0, . . . , cqM−1−H) which belongs to the kernel of D. For this vector to exist and be non-zero, we need
the kernel of D to be of dimension at least 1, for which the rank rk(D) of D must be smaller or equal
to qM−1 −H . Now we have that
rk(D) ≤ min(qM−1 −M, qM−1 −H + 1).
Thus if H ≤M as assumed, we get that
rk(D) ≤ min(qM−1 −M, qM−1 −H + 1) = qM−1 −M ≤ qM−1 −H
and we are done.
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2. As in the proof of Lemma 1, we first develop the product in x from F (x, y) = (x−α1) · · · (x−αQ)b(y)
to get
a(x) = (x− α1) . . . (x− αQ) = a0 + a1x+ . . .+ aQx
Q.
Since b(y) is given by
b(y) = (y − γ1) . . . (y − γH)c(y) = b0 + b1y + b2y
q . . .+ bMy
qM−1 ,
we can write
F (x, y) = (1, x, . . . , xQ)


a0
a1
a2
...
aQ

 (b0, b1, b2, . . . , bM )
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A


1
y
yq
...
yq
M−1


for the matrix A with coefficients in Fq′ . Since F (αq, y) = 0 for 1 ≤ q ≤ Q, we have that
F (αq, y) = (1, αq, . . . , α
Q
q )A


1
y
yq
...
yq
M−1

 = 0
for all y which proves the first equality. The claim follows similarly by using that F (x, γH) = 0 for
1 ≤ H ≤ M , by the previous point of the lemma. In words, the number of rows and columns of
the matrix A are decided by the number of (non-zero) coefficients in the polynomial a(x) and b(y)
respectively. On the other hand, the number of rows of the matrices with coefficients in γ and in α
depends on the number of roots of the respective polynomials.

Example 4 • Take first q = 2 and M = 3. For any choice of γ1, γ2, γ3, we can define
d(y) = (y − γ1)(y − γ2)(y − γ3).
Now since
b(y) = b0 + b1y + b2y
2 + b3y
4,
this means that we are looking for a linear polynomial
c(y) = y − γ4.
It is easy to see here that we can choose γ4 = γ1 + γ2 + γ3.
• Take q = 2 and M = 4. We have for any choice of γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4 that
d(y) = (y − γ1)(y − γ2)(y − γ3)(y − γ4)
= d0 + d1y + d2y
2 + d3y
3 + d4y
4
with
d0 = γ1γ2γ3γ4
d1 = −γ1γ2γ3 − γ1γ2γ4 − γ1γ3γ4 − γ2γ3γ4
d2 = γ1γ2 + γ1γ3 + γ2γ3 + γ1γ4 + γ2γ4 + γ3γ4
d3 = −γ1 − γ2 − γ3 − γ4
d4 = 1.
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The polynomial b(y) is given by
b(y) = b0 + b1y + b2y
2 + b3y
4 + b4y
8,
and in order to find a polynomial c(y) = c0+ c1y+ c2y
2+ c3y
3+ c4y
4+ c5y
5 such that c(y)d(y) = b(y),
we have to solve the following system of equations:


d3 d2 d1 d0 0
0 d4 d3 d2 d1
0 0 d4 d3 d2
0 0 0 d4 d3




c0
c1
c2
c3
c4
c5


=


0
0
0
0

 .
Clearly the dimension of the kernel is at least 1.
Lemma 3 If K ≤ k − 1 and H ≤M , there exist ql matrices Ak×(M+1) with coefficients in Fql such that
Ak×(M+1)G(M+1)×H = 0k×H , XK×kA = 0K×(M+1).
Proof. Let A = Ak×(M+1) be a solution to the above system of equations. Then the matrices rA obtained
by multiplication with a scalar r ∈ Fql are also clearly solutions, and it is thus enough to show that there
exists one suitable matrix A.
To prove that such a matrix exists, we use Lemma 2, for which we will exhibit a suitable bivariate
polynomial F (x, y) = a(x)b(y).
Let us start by looking at the second equation. For any choice of K public keys x1, . . . , xK in Fql , take
the polynomial a(x) = (x − x1) . . . (x − xK) = a0 + a1x + . . . + aKx
K . It is of degree K and has for roots
x1, . . . , xK . Thus
a(x) = (1, x, . . . , xK)


a0
a1
a2
...
aK

 = 0 for x = x1, . . . , xK .
We now consider the first equation AG = 0. We start by rewriting it in a different form. Recall that the
matrix G is of the form 

∑n
j=1 gj(ei1) . . .
∑n
j=1 gj(eiH )∑n
j=1 gj(ei1)sj . . .
∑n
j=1 gj(eiH )sj
∑n
j=1 gj(ei1)s
q(M−1)
j . . .
∑n
j=1 gj(eiH )s
q(M−1)
j

 .
Note that for any invertible matrix D, we have that
AG = 0 ⇐⇒ AGD = 0,
and there exists an invertible matrix D such that GD is of the Vandermonde like form


1 . . . 1
γ1 . . . γH
γq1 γ
q
H
γq
M−1
1 . . . γ
qM−1
H

 . (4)
17
Indeed, if all the coefficients of the first row of G are non zero, we can take D to be
D = diag((
n∑
j=1
gj(ei1))
−1, . . . , (
n∑
j=1
gj(eiH ))
−1),
in which case we have
γk =
∑n
j=1 gj(eik)sj∑n
j=1 gj(eik)
where the denominator is in Fq since it only depends on the network coding coefficients. If the ith coefficient
(say the first for example) of the first row is zero, then we can first compute GS with
S =

 1 0 01 0 0
0 IH−2


which yields 

∑n
j=1 gj(ei2) . . .
∑n
j=1 gj(eiH )∑n
j=1 gj(ei1)sj +
∑n
j=1 gj(ei2)sj . . .
∑n
j=1 gj(eiH )sj
∑n
j=1 gj(ei1)s
q(M−1)
j +
∑n
j=1 gj(ei2)s
q(M−1)
j . . .
∑n
j=1 gj(eiH )s
q(M−1)
j

 .
Now take
D′ = diag((
n∑
j=1
gj(ei2))
−1, (
n∑
j=1
gj(ei2))
−1, . . . , (
n∑
j=1
gj(eiH ))
−1)
and D = SD′ to finally obtain
γ1 =
∑n
j=1 gj(ei1)sj +
∑n
j=1 gj(ei2)sj∑n
j=1 gj(ei2)
, γk =
∑n
j=1 gj(eik)sj∑n
j=1 gj(eik)
, k ≥ 2.
Thus we can assume that we look at
AG = 0
with G of the form (4).
Now for all choices of γ1, . . . , γH , consider the polynomial b(y) in Fql [y] such that b(γi) = 0, i = 1, . . . , H ,
but also such that b(y) = b0 + b1y + b2y
q + . . . + bMy
q(M−1) . Such polynomial exists by the first part of
Lemma 2, as long as H ≤M . Thus
b(y) = (1, y, yq, . . . , yq
M−1
)


b0
b1
b2
...
bM

 = 0 for y = γ1, . . . , γH .
We can finally write
F (x, y) = (1, x, . . . , xK)


a0
a1
a2
...
aK

 (b0, b1, b2, . . . , bM )
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A


1
y
yq
...
yq
M−1


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for the (K + 1)× (M + 1) matrix A with coefficients in Fq′ . By the second part of Lemma 2, A satisfies

1 x1 . . . x
K
1
1 x2 . . . x
K
2
...
1 xK . . . x
K
K

A = 0K×(M+1)
and
A


1 1 . . . 1
γ1 γ2 . . . γh
γq1 γ
q
2 . . . γ
q
h
...
γq
M−1
1 γ
qM−1
2 . . . γ
qM−1
h

 = 0(K+1)×(M+1).
Since the matrix X build by the adversary has k columns, we require K + 1 = k, that is K = k − 1. This is
indeed the assumption that we made on K and k in the hypothesis, and this can be interpreted by the fact
that if K ≥ k, then the adversaries can find the source’s secret just from the matrix X . This concludes the
proof.

We are now ready to state the security of the proposed authentication scheme.
Proposition 1 Consider a multicast network implementing linear network coding, among which nodes V
of them are verifying nodes owning a private key for authentication. The above scheme is a (k, V,M)
unconditionally secure network coding authentication code against a coalition of up to k − 1 adversaries,
possibly among the verifying nodes, in which every key can be used to authenticate up to M messages, under
the assumption that H ≤M , where H is the sum of the incoming edges at each adversary.
Proof. To make a substitution attack, the malicious k− 1 verifying nodes want to generate a message such
that it is accepted as authentic by any honest verifying node Ri that they are trying to cheat. However, for
that, they need to guess its secret key [P0(xi), . . . , PM (xi)], and choose a polynomial A˜s(x) such that
A˜s(xi) = P0(xi) + s
qP1(xi) + . . .+ s
q(M−1)PM (xi)
for some message s. Gathering all they know after watching one transmission of tagged messages, the
coalition of adversaries get the following system of equations:
Ak×(M+1)G(M+1)×H = Ck×H , XK×kA = PK×(M+1).
If there is no matrix Ak×(M+1) satisfying this system, the information gathered by the adversaries is not
useful. Now if such a matrix Ak×(M+1) indeed exist, then there are actually q
l of them satisfying these
equations, given by
Ak×(M+1) +A
′
k×(M+1),
where A′ = A′
k×(M+1) is a solution of the corresponding homogeneous system of equations, and Lemma 3
tells us that there are ql such A′. Thus there are ql different (M+1)-tuple of polynomials (P˜0(x), . . . , P˜M (x))
likely to be the source’s private key, from which that there are ql equally likely private keys for Ri. Thus
the probability of the k − 1 receivers to guess A(xi) correctly is 1/q
l.

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Example 5 Let us go on with Example 2. The node R1 has received the vector(
y(e1)
y(e2)
)
with
y(e1) = (g1(e1) + g2(e1), g1(e1)s1 + g2(e1)s2, g1(e1)As1 (x) + g2(e1)As2 (x))
and
y(e2) = (g1(e2) + g2(e2), g1(e2)s1 + g2(e2)s2, g1(e2)As2(x) + g2(e2)As2(x)).
But this time, let us assume that the node R1 is malicious, and instead of checking the authentication tag,
it actually wants to make a substitution attack.
Since we have that
As1(x) = P0(x) + s1P1(x) + s
2
1P2(x)
= (a00 + a10s1 + a20s
2
1) + x(a01 + a11s1 + a21s
2
1)
=: b10 + xb11
As2(x) = P0(x) + s2P1(x) + s
2
2P2(x)
= (a00 + a10s2 + a20s
2
2) + x(a01 + a11s2 + a21s
2
2)
=: b20 + xb21,
we can rewrite
g1(e1)As1 (x) + g2(e1)As2 (x) = g1(e1)(b10 + xb11) + g2(e1)(b20 + xb21)
= g1(e1)b10 + g2(e1)b20 + x[g1(e1)b11 + g2(e1)b21].
The malicious node thus knows
c10 = g1(e1)b10 + g2(e1)b20, c11 = g1(e1)b11 + g2(e1)b21.
Alternatively, we can rewrite
g1(e1)As1(x) + g2(e1)As2(x)
= g1(e1)(a00 + a10s1 + a20s
2
1) + g2(e1)(a00 + a10s2 + a20s
2)
+xg1(e1)(a01 + a11s1 + a21s
2
1) + xg2(e1)(a01 + a11s2 + a21s
2
2)
= a00(g1(e1) + g2(e1)) + a10(g1(e1)s1 + g2(e1)s2) + a20(g1(e1)s
2
1 + g2(e1)s
2
2)
+x[a01(g1(e1) + g2(e1)) + a11(g1(e1)s1 + g2(e1)s2) + a21(g1(e1)s
2
1 + g2(e1)s
2
2)].
Since the malicious node knows g1(e1)+ g2(e1), g1(e1)s1+ g2(e1)s2 and g1(e1)s
2
1+ g2(e1)s
2
2, and by iterating
the computations for the second incoming edge, it can form the following system of linear equations:(
a0,0 a1,0 a2,0
a0,1 a1,1 a2,1
)
G =
(
c10 c2,0
c1,1 c2,1
)
where
G =

 g1(e1) + g2(e1) g1(e2) + g2(e2)g1(e1)s1 + g2(e1)s2 g1(e2)s1 + g2(e2)s2
g1(e1)s
2
1 + g2(e1)s
2
2 g1(e2)s
2
1 + g2(e2)s
2
2

 .
If R1 is not a verifying node, it should prepare an attack based on the knowledge of this system of equations.
We can illustrate the condition H ≤ M required for security. Suppose that it were not the case, that is
H = 2 but we have only M = 1, meaning that only two polynomials P0 and P1 are used to create the
authentication tag, then the matrix G would be a 2× 2 matrix, and thus could be very likely invertible, thus
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allowing the malicious node to recover the secret coefficients of the source private key, although the node
cannot decode the message.
Now if furthermore R1 has a private key [P0(x1), P1(x1), P2(x1)], it further knows that
(1, x1)
(
a0,0 a1,0 a2,0
a0,1 a1,1 a2,1
)
= (P0(x1), P1(x1), P2(x1)).
Let us assume for this example that the first row of G has non-zero coefficients, so that both coefficients are
invertible. We set
γ1 = (g1(e1)s1 + g2(e1)s2)(g1(e1) + g2(e1))
−1
γ2 = (g1(e2)s1 + g2(e2)s2)(g1(e2) + g2(e2))
−1
and we can rewrite G as 
 g1(e1) + g2(e1) g1(e2) + g2(e2)γ1(g1(e1) + g2(e1)) γ2(g1(e2) + g2(e2))
γ21(g1(e1) + g2(e1)) γ
2
2(g1(e2) + g2(e2))

 =

 1 1γ1 γ2
γ21 γ
2
2

( g1(e1) + g2(e1) 0
0 g1(e2) + g2(e2)
)
.
It is a straightforward computation to check that the matrices
rA = r
(
−x1γ1γ2 x1γ1 + x1γ2 −x1
γ1γ2 −γ1 − γ2 1
)
, r ∈ F32
satisfy the system of equations AG = 0, XA = 0, where X = (1, x1).
5 Multicast Goodput Analysis
In this section, we discuss the performance of our scheme in terms of multicast throughput and multicast
goodput. The multicast goodput is analyzed to assess the impact of pollution attacks in network coding
systems and to show how much the multicast throughput is degraded under such attacks.
The analysis starts with definitions of multicast throughput and multicast goodput. We then derive
their characterizations in our setting, depending on whether the proposed authentication scheme is used.
We provide three exemplary topologies with various numbers of intermediate nodes, shown in Figure 2, to
illustrate the multicast throughput gains obtained using our scheme.
5.1 Definitions
Recall that we have a single source S, sending n messages to T destination nodes D1, . . . , DT , while V will
denote the set of V receivers R1, . . . , RV that can verify the authentication tags. The intermediate nodes may
or may not have been corrupted by malicious messages. We will denote by Rc a set of intermediate nodes
with corrupted messages in their incoming buffers and by Rg a set of intermediate nodes with “good” (i.e.
non-corrupted) messages in their incoming buffers, with cardinality respectively |Rc| = rc and |Rg| = rg.
We consider a single multicast session s(S, n,R,D, rc) where the source node S delivers n messages to
all nodes in a destination set D ⊆ {D1, . . . , DT } through multi-hop paths in a set R of intermediate nodes
containing rc corrupted nodes.
We define the following performance metrics:
• The message rate of a multicast session s(S, n,R,D, rc) is termed the multicast throughput, and is
denoted by RSD.
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• The rate of messages successfully delivered to each destination per session s is termed throughput per
destination and is denoted by RSDi for the destination Di.
• The rate of non-corrupted messages of a multicast session s(S, n,R,D, rc) is termed the multicast
goodput. It is denoted by GSD if our scheme is used, and by G
′
SD otherwise.
• The rate of non-corrupted messages delivered to each destination per session s is termed the goodput
per destination and is denoted by GSDi for the destination Di if our scheme is used, and by G
′
SDi
otherwise.
5.2 Multicast goodput analysis without the authentication scheme
Pollution attacks degrade the multicast throughput RSD of a session with a degradation factor α ∈ [0, 1],
resulting in a multicast goodput of the form:
G′SD = αRSD.
The multicast goodput of a session s(S, n,R,D, rc) depends on the topology of the network and is
expressed by the following expression:
G′SD = (1−
npc
neD
)RSD (5)
where npc is the number of paths corrupted by rc, i.e., from the corrupted intermediate nodes Rc to the
destinations in D; and neD is the number of incoming edges in the destination set D. The multicast goodput
varies depending on the positions of the rc corrupted intermediate nodes in the network.
The average multicast goodput of a session s(S, n,R,D, rc) over all j positions of the rc corrupted
intermediate nodes in the network is expressed by:
G˜′SD =
∑λ
j=1G
′
SD(j)
λ
(6)
where λ is the combination of rc over r: λ = C
rc
r =
r!
rc!(r−rc)!
.
5.3 Multicast goodput analysis with the authentication scheme
With our authentication tags, if R ⊂ V , intermediate nodes in the network can then verify the integrity
and origin of the messages received without having to decode. They can detect and discard the corrupted
messages in-transit that fail the verification.
The corrupted messages are discarded at their entrance in the network, and therefore do not propagate
in the network towards the destinations. The multicast goodput is thus not degraded (α = 1), and equal to
the multicast throughput:
GSD = RSD. (7)
The average multicast goodput gain offered by our scheme is expressed as follows:
˜Gain = ˜GSD − ˜G′SD (8)
= ˜RSD − ˜G′SD (9)
where ˜G′SD is the average multicast goodput obtained without the use of our scheme.
Let us now present a few examples based on different topologies.
Topology a). In Figure 2, we consider the topology a) with various configurations Rc (this is also the
topology discussed in Example 1).
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Figure 2: Examples of network topologies.
n rc min(G
′
SD) max(G
′
SD) G˜
′
SD
3 1 13RSD
2
3RSD
1
2RSD
3 2 0 0 0
Table 3: Multicast Goodput results for Topology a)
• If n = 3, rc = 1 and our scheme is not used, we obtain:
G′SD = {
1
3
,
2
3
}RSD.
• If n = 3, rc = 2 and our scheme is not used, then Rg = 0 and :
G′SD = 0.
Topology b). In Figure 2, we consider the topology b) with again various configurations of Rc.
If n = 2, rc = 1 and our scheme is not used, we have two possibilities for the intermediate receiver that
holds corrupted packets:
• If the intermediate receiver with corrupted messages is on the first hop from the source (i.e., R1, R2),
then
G′SDi = {0,
1
2
} ×RSDi ,
G′SD =
1
4
RSD.
• If the intermediate receiver with corrupted messages is on the second hop from the source (i.e., R3),
then
G′SDi =
1
2
RSDi ,
G′SD =
2
4
RSD =
1
2
RSD.
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n rc min(G
′
SD) max(G
′
SD) G˜
′
SD
2 1 14RSD
1
2RSD
1
3RSD
2 2 0 14RSD
1
6RSD
2 3 0 0 0
Table 4: Multicast Goodput results for Topology b)
n rc min(G
′
SD) max(G
′
SD) G˜
′
SD
3 1 26RSD
4
6RSD
4
9RSD
3 2 0 36RSD
4
15RSD
3 3 0 26RSD
11
60RSD
3 4 0 26RSD
1
9RSD
3 5 0 16RSD
1
18RSD
3 6 0 0 0
Table 5: Multicast Goodput results for Topology c)
If rc = 2 and our scheme is not used, then we have rg = 1, and there are two possibilities again:
• If the intermediate receivers with corrupted messages are on the first hop from the source (i.e., R1,
R2), then
G′SDi = 0;G
′
SD = 0.
• If one intermediate receiver with corrupted messages is on the second hop from the source (i.e. R3)
and the other is on the first hop from the source (i.e., R1, R2), then
G′SDi = {0,
1
2
} ×RSDi ,
G′SD =
1
4
RSD.
If rc = 3 and our scheme is not used, we have rg = 0 and G
′
SD = 0. The multicast goodput results are
summarized in Table 4:
Topology c). In the topology c), we consider also various configurations of Rc. The multicast goodput
results are summarized in Table 5.
If we now consider the goodput gains with our scheme for topologies a), b), c), we get that for all rc,
GSD = RSD. In the three topologies, our scheme offers multicast goodput gains that are given in Table 6.
As the number of corrupted messages injected increases in the network, the average multicast goodput gain
naturally tends towards 1.
rc Topology a) Topology b) Topology c)
1 0,5 0,66 0,55
2 1 0, 83 0,73
3 - 1 0,81
4 - - 0,88
5 - - 0,94
6 - - 1
Table 6: Average Goodput Gains obtained with our scheme
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Figure 3: Structure of a message
6 Application to File distribution
In this section, we present how the proposed (k, V,M) authentication scheme could be easily applied to
content or file distribution. For content distribution over an IP-based network with our scheme, at most
M messages forming the file to be distributed can be transmitted by the source through the network in an
authenticated way using the same key. For our scheme to be secure against a coalition of k− 1 receivers, we
recall the following rules:
• M ≥ n, where n is the number of messages to be sent by the source.
• M ≥ H , where H is the maximum number of incoming edges in a coalition of malicious nodes.
We also define N as the size of the generation of IP packets carrying one message authenticated by one
tag. Figure 3 illustrates the relation between an IP packet and a message.
In a practical scenario, the following should be considered:
• a message consists of l symbols sij with a symbol being bit.
• one message authenticated by one tag consists of N IP packets (also called a generation).
• IP packets are 1500 bytes long (12000 bits) with a payload of 1480 bytes.
• The message length l can be expressed in bits and in bytes. We refer to lbits to the message length
expressed in bits and to lbytes to the message length expressed in bytes.
lbytes = 1500×N
lbits = 8× lbytes = 12000×N.
For M ≤ lbits, we have M ≤ 12000 × N , which means that the source can use the same key to tag at
most M = 12000×N messages of length 12000N bits (carried over N IP packets that are 12000 bits long).
Destinations can download a file with at most the following size in bytes (including headers): M× lbytes =
lbits × lbytes = 8 × l
2
bytes = 8 × (1500N)
2 = 18× 106 ×N2 bytes. The destinations can use the same key to
authenticate a file download of at most 18N2 MBytes when one tagged message is carried over N IP packets.
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File size Generation Size Message length Nb of messages authenticated
(bytes) N l (bytes) by the same key M
18M 1 1500 12 000
72M 2 3000 24 000
1.8G 10 15K 120 000
4.05G 15 22.5K 180 000
Table 7: Parameters of our scheme for distribution of files of variable sizes
A receiver node can have at most 12000×N incoming edges and the source S can send n ≤ 12000×N
messages.
The scenarios in Table 7 show what should be the size of an IP packet generation to allow the distribution
of a given file to be authenticated under the same key.
For distributing a file that is 18MBytes, it is sufficient for the source to send one tagged message in one
IP packet of 1500bytes . The source sends then 12 000 messages tagged that form the 18MBytes file. Any
destination can verify with the same key each tag attached to the 12 000 messages.
For distributing a file that is 1.8GBytes, the source generates tagged messages of size 15KBytes. Each
message is sent in a generation of 10 IP packets. The source sends 120K messages tagged that form the file.
At the destination, the same key can be used to verify the tags of the 120K messages received.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed an unconditionally secure authentication scheme that provides multicast
linear network coding with message integrity protection and source authentication. The resulting scheme
offers robustness against pollution attacks from outsiders and from k − 1 insiders. Our solution allows the
source to generate authentication tags for up to M messages with the same key and the intermediate nodes
to verify the authentication tags of the packets received and thus to detect and discard the malicious packets
that fail the verification. The performance analysis showed that our scheme offers goodput gains that tend
towards 1 with increasing corrupted packets in the network. Our scheme can be used to authenticate with
the same key a file download of at most 18N2 MBytes when one tagged message is carried over N IP packets.
Future work will involve optimization of the parameters involved in the authentication scheme for a more
efficient solution. Another aspect to consider in the future is to offer more flexibility over the sender as the
scheme proposed here requires the sender to be designated.
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